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not in their power to do so. In general the nature of the
duress must suggest the necessity, if such exist, for protesting.
Was the duress of so questionable a character that the payer
was bound in good conscience to speak out? If the compulsion is clearly illegal in itself, or if the peculiar circumstances of the payment will of themselves create a necessary
presumption of extortion, no protest is required. But where
the compulsion is legal itself and only employed for an
illegal purpose, the illegality being hidden from the payee's
view, a protest must usually be made. Especially will this be
so where the payer receives a consideration for his money.
In such cases, the payee's act of taking not-being wrongful in
itself, he is not subsequently bound ex arquo et bono to refund
the amount of the exaction. If the payee receives the money
only as an agent for a third party the duty to protest may be
more evident. Where the agent himself is not responsible
for the duress, where he is only a mere conduit for the transfer
of the money to his principal, it is clear that the payer, in
order to fasten a liability upon the agent, must give the latter
notice before he has paid the money over to his principal.
If the case either at common law or by statute requires a
protest, the protest should be adequate and complete.
Finally, the legal adviser shotfld remember that, though
a protest is necessary only in a very small number of cases,
it may be desirable in a great many. Its effect with the
jury in the action for a recovery should not be disregarded.
FRANCIS FISHER KANE.
THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT LAW.

The Australian Ballot Law of Connecticut has lately come before the
Supreme Court of Errors in that State, and a decision rendered on two
important points. (Fieldsv. Osborne, decided June i, i891).
The Pub. Acts. Conn. 1889, C. 247, No. ix, requires all ballots to contain
the name of the party issuing them. The petitioner contended that the
"Citizens' Party," which was the name printed on the ballots cast against
him never had existed, and 'therefore the ballots were illegal and void.
Seymour, J., states the facts on which the contention was based as-follows:
Pursuant to public notice a Republican caucas was held October 4, 1891,
for the purpose of nominating candidates for the town offices to be filled
at the town meeting aforesaid. Immediately after the caucus was
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-organized, a plan for making up a Citizens' ticket from candidates of all
political parties, was advocated. After discussion, it was voted that the
Republican caucas adjourn, and that a Citizens' caucas be organized.
Thereupon, some ten or fifteen Democrats who were present, but had not
participated in the proceedings, came forward and acted with about fifty
Republicans who were present, in nominating the Citizens' ticket. The
candidates nominated were Republicans, except those for town clerk,
treasurer, and one grand juror, who were Democrats. A general collection was taked to defray the expenses of printing the ticket. No committees were appointed at said caucus to carry out its purposes, nor were any
steps taken to effect a permanent organization of a Citizens' party, or to
provide for its further existence. The chairman of the Republican town
committee procured the printing of said Citizens' ticket, and caused them
to be placed in the booths on election day. The Republican party issued
no tickets, and no ballots were used at the election except those headed
"Democratic" and those headed "Citizens' Ticket." Previous to the
caucus in question, there had been no call issued for a Citizens' caucus,
nor any organized political party in the town of Branford, known as the
"Citizens' Party," but there had been some talk among a few Republicans
and the Democrats about the possibility of having a Citizens' caucus, and
of turning the Republican caucus, that had been called, into a Citizens'
caucus. Occasionally in previous years, town officers have been elected
in said town on tickets denominated "Citizens' Ticket."
The Court held that the Citizens' party was a party within the meaning
of the Act. J. Seymour uses the following language: "We are abundantly satisfied from the facts stated in the finding, that for the time being,
and for the purpose of the election under consideration, and within the
meaning of the law, requiring the ballots to contain the name of the party
issuing them, there was a "Citizens' Party" in Branford. The element
of time is not essential to the formation of a legal party. It may spring
into existence from the exigencies of a particular election, and with no
intention of continuing after the exigency has passed. To hold the contrary, would be to strike a blow at that independence in political actiqn,
upon which the good government of a locality may depend. Nor can the
number of voters that must unite in order to form a legal party prescribed
by law without violating one of the fundamental theories of popular government. If it is shown, as it is in this case, that an independent political
party was formed, that it assumed a distinctive name, and that the ballots
which it issued sought the suffrages of the people under no false title, but
bore the name of the political party issuing them, it is enough, so far as
the point now being considered is concerned. To hold otherwise would
be to abridge rights which are not only generally held to be sacred, but
which it is of the utmost importance to preserve.
The second reason on which the petitioner based his petition was
because ioo or more citizens' ballots also contained the following illegal
words: "For Judge of Probate, Henry A. Steadman." It appears that
the Citizens' caucus, in addition to the town officers that could be voted
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for at .the annual town meeting, also nominated Henry H. Steadman forthe office of Judge of Probate, which office could only be filled at the election held for State offieers, etc., on the Tuesday following the first Monday
of November thereafter, and that each of the Citizens' tickets had upon it
the words. "For Judge of Probate, Henry H. Steadman." It also appears.
that the Democratic ballots issued and cast at said election contained,
after the words "For Town Clerk," the words " and ex-offido Registrarof births, marriages and deaths."
The ninth section of the Ballot Act is as follows:
"If any ballot shall contain any mark or device so that the same maybe identified in such manner as to indicate who might have cast the same,
it shall not be counted," etc. All ballots so cast shall be void and not.
counted.
The Court held that the addition of the words "For Judge of Probate,
Henry H. Steadman," on the Citizens' ballot, and the words "ex-offido,
lRegistrar of births, marriages and deaths;" on the Democratic ballots,
mentioned, were both void.
' The Court says: "A plain provision of the law is violated in a point
concerning which the Act does not authorize us to inquire into the intent.
or the consequences of the violation. In short, the Legislature has seen
fit to say if.a ballot contains the addition to the specified contents which
these do it shall be void. Unless we are prepared to hold the Act unconstitutional, we cannot disregard its requirements. If.it is harsh and
unreasonable the remedy is with the Legislature that enacted it, and noL
with the Couirts, which are bound to respect it. In regard to provisions.
which are plain on their face, which are not dependent upon the question
of good faith or the actual or possible result of disregarding them, we can
only say again, in the language of the majority opinion in Talcolt vs.
Philbrick,59 Conn., 478, 'we are relieved of any obligation to inquireinto the necessity or reason of such requirement; and we are not at liberty to dispense with anything that is required, whatever the reason for it
may be, or even without any apparent reason at all. The Legislature
has spoken, and obedience is our first and only duty. It is at liberty tothrow around the ballot-box such safeguards and regulations as it may
deem proper, and it is the duty of the citizen to conform thereto. Someinconvenience is not too great a price to pay for an honest and pureballot.'
The defendants further claimed that the Democratic ballots were illegal,
because they contained the word "for" before the name of any officer.
To this contention the court said: "If it was plain and clear that the Act,
in limiting the contents of the ballot to the official indorsement, thenames of the candidates, the name of the political party issuing the same,
and the 'office voted for,' prohibited the use of the word 'for' before the
title to the office, we should be bound, npon the principles which we have
herein already recognized as sound, to declare the ballots void for that
reason. But that the statute so intended is not plain and clear. On the
contrary, the language is ambiguous. There is room for honest and intel-.
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ligent men to differ as to its meaning. The record in this very case
shows that the Secretary of the State, in a notice concerning elections
issued in August, 1889, immediately after the Act went into force, and
before any discussion had arisen upon the point in hand, inclosed a printed
form for a town ballot. This was sent to every postmaster and town clerk
and to the respective chairmen of the Democratic and Republican Committees in every town in the State; and the form of ballots so sent contained the word 'for' before the title to every office named therein. It is
a matter of public notoriety also that ballots prepared by different persons equally determined to observe the requirements of the law have in
some cases contained the word'for' in juxtaposition with the offices voted
for, and sometimes omitted it. The Republican ballots as well as the
Democratic ballots in the case before us contained the word. We refer to.
these instances in confirmation of our position that the language under
consideration is in fact ambiguous. If ambiguous it is the proper subject
of construction. In discharging the duty of construing it so that the
voter shall not be deprived of his vote, except upon a plain and unambiguous provision of the law, we feel bound to hold that the Act does not
in terms and expressly, nor by necessary construction, prohibit the use of
the word 'for' before the title to the office. It follows, therefore, that
neither its use nor the failure to use it necessarily and of itself invalidates
a ballot The question of illegality is remitted to the provisions of theninth section of the Act. If the regular ballots issued by a political party
contain the word 'for' before the title to the offices therein named, then
it cannot be held to be a 'mark or device' so that the same may be iden-.
tified in such manner as to indicate who might have cast the same, and,
therefore, is not obnoxious to that provision. If the regular ballots
of a political party omit the word 'for' in the connection stated, then the
use of the word on some of the ballots cast, inasmuch as it would be a,
mark or device by which the same might be identified, would be illegal.
Each case must be governed by its own circumstances, and be decided as
as a question of fact under the principles herein stated. Upon the facts
in this case we hold that the ballots in question were not illegal and void
because of the use of the word 'for.' They were, however, illegal, as we
have already stated, for another reason. Being illegal, there is no foundation for the petitioner's claim that he was elected Selectman, and his
petition, which was based upon that claim, must be dismissed. We so,
advise."

